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TOWARD DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN OFFSHORE NATURAL RESOURCES 
DEVELOPMENT:  ICELAND AND NORWAY IN THE JAN MAYEN 
by Anita L. Parlow, Esq.1 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
As pressures of globalization and advances in technology accelerate, more and more remote, 
coastal, and small communities are left financially stranded and disempowered. Many 
communities located at the historic periphery of global markets and trade routes are, often 
paradoxically, marginalized from the benefits of globalized trade, even while their more 
accessible natural resources have moved far closer to the center of global markets. 
 The powerful political institutions of nation states combined with growing transnational 
businesses are driving a combination of boosts in national economies, explosions in technology, 
and fewer international restrictions on capital. This three-pronged dynamic is reshaping the 
structure and impacts of an accelerating global economy, creating an international global class of 
citizenry for whom borders have diminished meaning. 
                                                 
1 Anita L. Parlow, Esq. Mst., a Fulbright Iceland Scholar, Team Lead for the Woodrow Wilson 
Polar Code Roundtable Project, and advisor, Harvard–MIT Arctic Fisheries Project. Parlow, who 
has authored numerous op-eds, has advised corporate, tribal and international organization on 
social and environmental risk, corporate responsibility and due diligence issues. Parlow, a 
member of the Bar of the United States Supreme Court, earned an advanced degree in law at 
Oxford University.  
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As more remote, coastal and small communities are left behind, a new generation of rights 
building upon protections of the environment, Indigenous peoples, and climate is setting the 
table to collectively protect entire communities, marginalized as collateral damage to the forces 
of globalization.  
  
This article draws from relevant principles of international law (UNCLOS,) national practice of 
Norway, the “ Norwegian Model” and other Arctic national views to posit that the evolution of 
domestic and international law is evolving in the direction of distributive justice strategies that 
are focused not on individual rights, but rather on the collective rights of marginalized 
communities to benefit from national policies that would protect them from the downsides of 
globalization for whom global growth and interconnectedness has not yet met expectations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 As pressures of globalization and advances in technology accelerate, more remote, 
coastal, and small communities are left financially stranded and disempowered.2  Many 
communities located at the historic periphery of global markets and trade routes are, often 
paradoxically, marginalized from the benefits of globalized trade.  This being the case even 
while the more accessible natural resources located near the remote, often coastal communities, 
have moved closer to the center of global markets.3  The powerful political institutions of nation 
states, combined with growing transnational businesses, propel boosts in national economies as 
                                                 
2 Larisa Riabova, COMMUNITY VIABILITY AND WELL-BEING IN THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH, IN 
GLOBALIZATION AND THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH, 119, 128 (Lassi Heininen & chris Southcott 
eds., 2010). (“To ensure viability of remote communities lying at the periphery of markets, 
technology networks or loss of traditional natural resources requires that the “communities 
themselves are engaged in improving their own well-being.”); see also Daniel Boyd Kramer ET 
AL., GLOBALIZATION AND THE CONNECTION OF REMOTE COMMUNITIES, 68 Ecological Econs. 
2897 (Elsevier, 3 August 2009.) 
3 RICHARD WARD, ARCTIC OPENING: OPPORTUNITY AND RISK IN THE HIGH NORTH, Chatham 
House. (2012), 
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/publications/0412arctic.pdf; see also  
The Economist, The melting north (Jun. 16, 2012) [https://perma.cc/D38Z-7U3N]. 
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well as technology and fewer regulatory restrictions on international restrictions on capital.4  
This three-pronged dynamic is reshaping the structure and impacts of an accelerating global 
economy, creating an international global class of citizenry for whom borders have diminished 
meaning.5  Despite the proverbial “rising-tide-lifts-all-boats” promise, widening disparities 
between corporate wealth and main-street has reached levels of impact, visibility, and public 
opposition that can no longer be ignored.6  Entire communities and their historic economies have 
been increasingly marginalized due to the forces of globalization and the international integration 
of production and markets.7  The process of globalization has exposed deep fault lines between 
                                                 
4 MANFRED B. STEGER, GLOBALIZATION: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION, 37-43 (2003).  
5 Elias G. Carayannis et al., Globalization, Nation-States, and Global Governance, in 13  
INNOVATION, TECHNOLOGY, AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT BOOK SERIES (2011). 
6 Dani Rodrik, Has Globalization Gone too Far?, Institute for International Economics, 2-4 
(1997). Disparities, not only economic, include dispossession from long-time local economies 
inextricably tied to healthy environments, such as both subsistence hunting and fishing for daily 
existence and, commercial fishing. 
7 Traditional economies are utilized here in two distinct but interrelated contexts: first, traditional 
subsistence economies are those protected by international law as it applies to Indigenous 
peoples with specific application to subsistence, rather than commercial, hunting, fishing and 
gathering. Second, traditional economies are those of any community, such as those the 
automotive once supported, that was offshored or left in substantial decline due to the attraction 
to low wage and cost global competitors. An appropriate practice of distributive justice would 
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those with the ability to access emerging economic conditions and those without.8  These 
disparities were recently illustrated by mass opposition rallies in the streets of Hamburg, 
Germany, as world leaders arrived for the 2017 G-20 meetings.9 
 Whether or not globalization continues to increase at the pace of past decades, the 
trajectory of income disparities is likely to continue.10  Global alliances of domestic and 
transnational non-governmental organizations will likely follow a similar trajectory in 
developing common and interlinked initiatives to produce policy and law designed to curb 
globalism’s excesses.11  Thus far, international advocacy has focused on protecting the rights of 
                                                 
consider both the subsidence, Indigenous, industry and wage loss situations to develop new 
opportunities and different competitive advantages. 
8 Rodrick, supra note 6.  
9 Bill Chapell, G-20 Hamburg: Tens of Thousands Demonstrates on Summit’s Last Day, NPR 
(July 8, 2017, 12:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/07/08/536159574/g20-
hamburg-thousands-demonstrate-on-summits-last-day, [https://perma.cc/7MMK-3NKF]; see 
also Marie E. Lowe, Localized Practices and Globalized futures: Challenges for Alaska Coastal 
Community Youth, Lowe Maritime Studies (July 16, 2015) [https://perma.cc/7AH8-6HPK] 
(several scholars noted, with respect to Alaska, the next generation is “caught between traditions 
that no longer work and new opportunities they are not ready to grasp.”). 
10   Martin Wolf, Seven Charts That Show How the Developed World is Losing its Edge, Fin. 
Times (July 19, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6N4N-K84N]. 
11 William K. Tabb, Economic Governance in the Age of Globalization, 346-347 (Columbia 
Univ. Press 2004).  
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Indigenous peoples, environmental protections on land and sea, climate change, and labor 
rights.12  These initiatives have succeeded in placing limits on what may otherwise be considered 
unrestricted global trade, given its advances in technologies, vertical integration of industries, 
and highly capitalized global markets.  This relatively new generation of “rights” regarding the 
environment, Indigenous peoples, and climate, is setting the table to expand upon international 
law to protect communities that are marginalized as an externality to the forces of globalization.   
This article posits that the evolution of domestic and international law is trending in the 
direction of distributive justice strategies.  These evolving strategies are not focused solely on 
individuals, but also for the growing number of remote, local, and coastal communities 
beginning to experience a breakdown of long-standing social contracts with their governments.13  
                                                 
12 See Margaret E. Keck & Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics, 121-163 (Cornell University Press 1998); see Martha Finnemore and 
Katherine Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamic and Political Change, International 
Organization, 887- 917, 895 (1998); see generally United Nations Global Compact, Leadership 
of the UN Global Compact: Our CEO & Executive Director (last visited Oct. 10, 2017) 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/about/governance/executive-director (U.N. Global Compact 
offers a global response to the challenges of ‘social license,’ bringing the advocacy for 
environment, Indigenous and climate rights into a voluntary forum designed to improve upon 
and respond to community impacts). 
13 BRUCE E. MOON, THE UNITED STATES AND GLOBALIZATION: STRUGGLES WITH HEGEMONY, 
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER (Richard Stubbs and Geoffrey R.D. 
Underhill eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1988) (Reprint 2005) [https://perma.cc/BD5B-GTQG]. 
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Additionally, this article describes the legal architecture in international law that provides a 
foundation for the global justice discourse as it builds toward a consensus that rights and 
protections be extended to entire communities, once vibrant and thriving, now vulnerable and 
often impoverished by globalization’s considerable forces.14  Finally, the article reflects upon 
Norway, a nation that has operationalized the language of distributive justice through its 
Sovereign Wealth Fund (“SWF”).15 
II. DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
For purposes of this article, the concept of distributive justice builds upon, yet is quite 
distinct from, the special legal protections or restorations evident in the growing network of 
treaties, conventions, statutes, and bilateral agreements designed to restore, prevent, or stop 
negative impacts on the environment and individuals.  Distributive justice seeks to correct by 
international law the colonization of Indigenous peoples and the degradation of marine and 
terrestrial environments, or to reverse the minimal legal, environmental or social constraints 
                                                 
14 CHRIS ARMSTRONG, JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: AN EGALITARIAN THEORY 36-74 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2017); see also RYSZARD M. CZARNY, A MODERN NORDIC SAGA: POLITICS, 
ECONOMY AND SOCIETY, 30-31, 79 (2017) (ebook) (“Among the most important operational 
sources of the Nordic cooperation model, one could list constitutional tradition, citizen 
movement activity and civil society … If we combine all these with diligent work and 
entrepreneurship, we should obtain the constitutive features of a social construct…”). 
15 The SWF distributes investment gains from its offshore oil revenues.  It is significant that 
Norway’s distributive approach evolved not in response to external pressures, but rather a deeply 
rooted national concept of governmental responsibility to its citizenry. 
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historically placed on business activity.16  In these instances, the rationale for distributive justice 
is somewhat restorative, yet more anticipatory, given the global trends that continue to 
marginalize Indigenous communities while stimulating a rebuild of their community economy 
which, in turn, alters their community identity.17  Given that governments both regulate and 
financially benefit from globalizing trade and markets, equity would appear to require a 
distributive policy in domestic law rather than find acceptable the collateral damage to once 
thriving, remote, and coastal communities.18  This article raises the question of the responsibility 
of sovereign governments to correct the imbalances. 
A. Procedure and Substance 
Distributive justice has both procedural and substantive dimensions.  It is the view of this 
article that distributive justice is based more on the quality and equity of the procedure rather 
than on specific outcomes.  Although influenced by international law, distributive justice is also 
tailored by domestic processes to the particularities of each nation.  Communities and their 
                                                 
16 Tabb, supra note 11.  
17 ROGER HOWARD, THE ARCTIV GOLD RUSH: THE NEW RACE FOR TOMORROW’S ARCTIC 
RESOURCES 82-84 (2009) (describes transformation of the coastal town of Hammerfest from 
declining fishing and reindeer herding to “unrecognizable” from Snoehvit, or Snow White gas.).  
18 Andras Miklos, Institutions In Global Distributive Justice, Edinburgh 1-2 (2013) (contrasting 
state-based obligations to its citizenries with concepts of distributive justice as a global 
obligation); see also The Many Concepts of Social Justice In European Private Law 180 (Hans-
W. Micklitz ed. 2011) (“a sustainable society cannot accept the degree of inequality currently 
being produced.”).  
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citizenry who have been dispossessed of their livelihoods, marginalized, or otherwise negatively 
impacted by development decisions, must view the level of national procedure as significantly 
credible for those communities to sustain a belief in the equity of the government process.  
Despite the specific outcomes, if the public participation procedures are perceived as 
fundamentally fair, then the outcome, even if unfavorable, is likely to be perceived as acceptable.  
Thus, the processes of distributive justice contain the potential to deepen democracy itself.  More 
inclusive processes for stakeholder input has the potential to reduce the extent of community 
vulnerability. 
Broad community participation in national decision-making enables the identification of 
specific actions regarding national regulatory strategies and global markets that might otherwise 
be unnoticed.19  Furthermore, this level of inclusivity has the capacity to ensure that distributive 
and sustainable results are achieved.  With proper national and local feed-back mechanisms, 
decisions can be better refined to meet changing circumstances as they unfold.  For example, a 
collapsed fishing community seeking to build a successful alternative economic base can more 
ably convey the specific resources needed from its central government to accomplish the task.  
This approach has been called a “redistribution of sovereign power” designed to curb both 
corporate and government excess, or where large-scale privately owned and developed natural 
resources benefit only a few.20 
III. ARCTIC CONTEXT 
                                                 
19 George Vasiliev, Minority Rights Activism beyond Borders, 36 J. OF POL’Y. STUD. 329, 332 
(2015).  
20 Id.  
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This High North polar region’s primary source of income generation for each of the 
Arctic nations – Canada, Russia, Norway, Iceland, Greenland via Denmark, and Alaska in the 
United States –  are natural resources, particularly oil, gas, geothermal energy development, and 
commercial fishing.21  The reason to consider distributive justice in Arctic offshore natural 
resources development is twofold: (1) offshore natural resources are foundational for income 
generation in the High North, and (2) the strongest examples of distributive justice worldwide 
are located in the Arctic region.22   
In some Arctic nations, a paradox is unfolding amongst some rural, coastal, and remote 
communities between the high expectations from the benefits of global commerce, and anxiety 
about the marginalization from globalization’s economic benefits.  With greater surface 
warming, and melting sea ice, the Arctic region is warming twice as fast as the rest of the 
planet.23 The retreating sea-ice and warming waters have advanced often-opposing commercial 
                                                 
21 See Arnfinn Jørgensen-Dahl, Arctic Energy and Mineral Resources, Arctis Knowledge Hub 
(2010) [https://perma.cc/WYW4-AHG7]; See generally LARS LINDHOLDT, THE ECONOMY OF 
THE NORTH: ARCTIC NATURAL RESOURCES IN A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Solveig Glomsrød and 
Julie Aslaksen eds. 2006) [https://perma.cc/B848-YF3V]. 
22 CHRIS ARMSTRONG, JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCES: A EGALITARIAN THEORY 9-26 (2017).  
23 Christopher Joyce, Arctic is Warming Twice as Fast as World Average, National Public Radio 
(Dec. 18, 2014) [https://perma.cc/95ZV-7LCT]; see E. Carina H. Keskitalo et al., Climate 
Governance in the Arctic: Introduction and Theoretical Framework, in Climate Governance in 
the Arctic, 1-22 (Timo Koivurova, E. Carina H. Keskitalo, & Nigel Bankes eds., 2009); see also 
Timo Koivurova & Md. Waliul Hasanat. The Climate Policy of the Arctic Council, in Climate 
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and environmental interests, such as shipping, offshore oil and gas development,24 commercial 
fishing, and the protection of marine ecosystems25 and climate.26 It has also elevated geopolitical 
interest in the Arctic as part of the world’s foreign policy agenda.27   
The development, production, and exportation of the Arctic’s vast natural resources are 
expected to increase in the near and distant future.28  The combination of the Arctic’s substantial 
offshore oil and gas deposits, projections of increased commercial shipping, the continued 
growth of a vertically integrated fishing industry, and an expansion of port-to-port agreements 
amongst the major ports of the nations of the North Atlantic, reflect greater Arctic-wide 
integration into both the region and the global economy. 
                                                 
Governance in the Arctic, 51-75 (Timo Koivurova, E. Carina H. Keskitalo, & Nigel Bankes eds., 
2009). 
24 Council of Foreign Relations, The Emerging Arctic (2014) [https://perma.cc/DPS5-WJN9].  
25   Hajo Eiken, Internationally Coordinated, Cooperative Arctic Marine Science during the 
Fourth International Polar Year, in ARCTIC SCIENCE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CLIMATE 
CHANGE 285, 298 (Susanne Wasum-Rainer, Ingo Winkelmann & Katrin Tiroch eds., 2011). 
26 The Paris Agreement, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
[https://perma.cc/J4Z9-A2NY] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).  
27 Rob Huebert, Rising Temperatures, Rising Tensions: Power Politics and Regime Building in 
the Arctic, in Polar Oceans Governance in an Era of Environmental Change, 65 (Tim Stephens 
& David L. VanderZwaag eds., 2014). 
28 Charles Emmerson & Glada Lahn, Arctic Opening: Opportunity and Risk in the High North, 5 
(2012).  
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Despite the recent collapse of the price of oil, declining offshore oil fields on the 
Norwegian shelf, the high cost of offshore oil exploration and production in the High North and 
increased opposition to petroleum development,29 new discoveries are ongoing.  For example, in 
the resource-rich Barents Sea – the current subject of a Greenpeace lawsuit against the 
Norwegian government on climate change grounds30 – the anticipated steady oil driven growth 
in Norway’s offshore is about five times Norway’s current substantial annual production.31 
A. Growth Trajectory 
Despite the considerable resources in the High North, it is not clear that all of the oil 
producing states in the Arctic region will continue with their earlier growth trajectories, given the 
                                                 
29 Emma Wilson & Florian Stammler, Beyond Extractivism and Alternate Cosmologies: Arctic 
Communities and Extractive Industries in Uncertain Times, 3 EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES AND 
SOC’Y 1 (2016) (“Where industrial activity takes place, local involvement in shaping an 
industry’s ‘social license to operate’ (e.g.,might) offer a counterbalance to an ‘extractivist’ 
imperative, by focusing more on equitable benefit sharing and protection of local livelihoods and 
the environment.”). 
30 Vilhelm Carlstrøm, Greenpeace’s Historical Lawsuit Against Norway for Arctic Drilling Has 
Been Approved for Court, BUSINESS INSIDER NORDIC (Feb. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/9SWY-
2NWJ]; Writ of Summons, Greenpeace Nordic (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://www.greenpeace.org/norway/Global/norway/Arktis/Dokumenter/2016/legal_writ_english_
final_20161018.pdf. 
31 Espen Erlingsen, Barents Sea: Norway’s Emerging Oil Province, OFFSHORE (Aug. 11, 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/YPB8-V5SQ]. 
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combination of the recent collapse in the price of oil, the high costs of Arctic development, 
economic sanctions against Russia, and significant public opposition to carbon fuels.32 However, 
over the next twenty years it is anticipated that oil and gas production will grow and thrive.33 
Recent joint initiatives, such as the ongoing Norway and Russia agreement,34 and the 
projected petroleum development between Iceland and Norway, offers not only a glimpse of the 
Arctic’s commercial future, but an example of an effective distributive revenue model.35 
B. Distributive Justice and Natural Resources Development 
                                                 
32   Peter F. Johnston, Arctic Energy Resources and Global Energy Security, 12 JOURNAL OF 
MIL. AND STRATEGIC STUD. 1, 11-15 (2010); see Arctic Monitoring and Assessment 
Program, ASSESSMENT 2007: OIL AND GAS ACTIVITIES IN THE ARCTIC – EFFECTS AND POTENTIAL 
EFFECTS 7-2 (Carolyn Symon ed., 2010); see Reuters Staff, Norway and Russia to Step Up 
Cooperation in Hunt for Arctic Oil, REUTERS (Nov. 28, 2016) [https://perma.cc/XDE6-PAQW]. 
33 Alex Williams ET AL., The Future of the Arctic Enterprise: Long Term Outlook and 
Implications, Smith School of Enterprise and Environment University of Oxford, 28 (2011) 
[https://perma.cc/6RVV-MURE]. 
34 See Beth Gardiner, Iceland Aims to Seize Opportunities in Oil Exploration, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 
1, 2013) [https://perma.cc/95RZ-AR3A]; see also Ithaca Kolventi and Petoro License in the 
Dreki Area Relinquished, NATIONAL ENERGY AUTHORITY (Jan. 4, 2017)[https://perma.cc/H4PC-
RRAK]. 
35 See generally Iceland Energy Policy, Laws and Regulation Handbook: Volume 1 Strategic 
Information and Basic Laws (2016). 
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The development of natural resources is foundational to the global citizenry and essential 
to nations where energy production is a cornerstone to national economies, such as those in the 
Arctic High North.36  Arctic nations, particularly Norway, Iceland, Finland, and the State of 
Alaska, are on the forefront of practice and thinking about the issues of environmental 
sustainability and distributive justice.37  In that respect, the evolution of the “Norwegian Model” 
offers, perhaps, the most successful example for distributive justice.  This has encouraged other 
States to look to the Norwegian Model for guidance, as green shoots of distributive justice 
become visible in both its national policy and Constitutional practice, particularly in the Arctic. 
Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a 
natural environment whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural 
resources shall be managed on the basis of comprehensive long-term 
considerations which will safeguard this right for future generations as well. . . . 
[T]he authorities of the state shall take measures for the implementation of these 
principles.38 
 
                                                 
36 Lars Lindholdt, Arctic Natural Resources in a global perspective, in THE ECONOMY OF THE 
NORTH 27-37 (Solveig Glomsrod & Julie Alasken eds., 2008) [https://perma.cc/33WP-WU37]. 
37 Edward Canuel, Sustainable Development and Natural Resources Extraction, and the Arctic: 
The Road Ahead, 32 ALASKA L. REV. 31-63 (2016) [https://perma.cc/5YZT-ZJ6Z]; see Karl 
Widerquist, About the Alaska Dividend, Alaska Dividend Blog (Nov. 13, 2017 12:41PM) 
[https://perma.cc/DQZ2-YM62]. 
38 Norwegian [constitution] May 17, 1814, art. 112 (Nor.).  
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The concept of private ownership of natural resources and a national distributive framework for 
revenue arguably illuminates a considerable, although not unresolvable, tension between the 
concepts of sovereignty, private ownership, and the democratic process.  Globalization and 
global integration is certainly not all negative.  What is in question, given the breathtaking 
velocity of the internationalization of trade, markets, and capital, is whether governments will 
specifically assist the hard working, enduring communities whose citizenry finds themselves 
irrelevant to global markets or lacking access to tools that would support community resiliency 
and the capacity to recreate its economic life.  Government regulatory support and guidance to 
assist the citizenry of marginalized communities to find a future within the new economic 
landscape is the cornerstone of distributive justice.39 
B. Iceland 
Iceland, the small island nation located in the Arctic perimeter between the geologically 
similar Norway and Greenland, arguably offers new possibilities for a distributive model. The 
Icelandic government, as it engages a joint offshore petroleum development project in 
cooperation with Norway, is also in the preliminary stages of considering how to allocate 
revenues generated by its offshore natural resources development.  
                                                 
39 Iceland’s Finnafjord port inches closer, PORTSTRATEGY (Feb. 1, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/3QLN-R7MU] (Finnafjord, a coastal town on Iceland’s east coast, is seeking to 
build a deep water port in advance of the Jan Mayen petroleum development project and to serve 
as a port of call for the likely increase in Arctic traffic as the sea ice in the high North retreats. It 
is anticipated that construction might begin as early as 2020 for a remote, coastal community to 
expand its use, creating jobs and infrastructure).  
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The Iceland-Norway cooperative petroleum project in the Jan Mayen region, located 
within Iceland’s 200 nautical mile exclusive economic zone (“EEZ”) waters,40 is iconic to 
Iceland’s combination of a globalizing economy, fishing community decline, along with new 
possibilities for eastern port communities, proximate to the Dreki licensing region.41  
Environmental protections at the highest levels, and, possibly, a Norwegian-style 
Sovereign Wealth Fund has opened questions of what an Icelandic distributive strategy might 
look like and, what national conceptual framework and legislative gaps are needed to achieve it.  
Optimistic estimates ranging from 1 – 10 billion barrels of oil equivalent (“BOE”) in projected 
petroleum development in the Iceland-Norway joint development area, the Dreki license in the 
                                                 
40 See GUDNI TH JOHANNESSON, TROUBLED WATER: COD WAR FISHING DISPUTES AND BRITAIN’S 
FIGHT FOR THE FREEDOM OF THE HIGH SEAS, 1948-1969 (2007); ANDREW WELCH, THE ROYAL 
NAVY IN THE COD WARS (2006).  
41 Finnafjord, located on Iceland’s north-east coast, is being revitalized by a public-private 
community-municipality-investor port project that will serve as a base-port for the projected 
offshore oil and gas, serve as a hub-port for trans-Arctic shipping and serve as a service and 
search and rescue port. The support for this deep-water port project at the national level, with its 
emergence from the municipality level, offers a world class example of how local and national 
governments along with private industry can revive and recreate a local economy in the midst of 
globalization. While Finnafjorder offers a compelling story given the timeliness of the need to 
build infrastructure to support offshore petroleum and shipping growth to the national growth 
strategy, it offers a world class example of public-private, national-local investment strategies 
that draw an otherwise marginalized community into the national and global economy.  
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Jan Mayen region,42 contains the potential to significantly boost Iceland’s revenues.43 This has 
stimulated a preliminary conversation at national and local levels regarding the Norwegian 
Model and its distributive implications regarding natural resources development.44  In this 
context, green shoots of distributive justice have been unfolding since Iceland’s recovery from 
the 2008 financial crash that impoverished both individuals and the state.45 
Two years after the crash, the Icelandic Parliament established a Consultative 
Constitutional Assembly46 that was assigned the complex task of revising its 1944 Constitution 
through a participatory national forum.  While a majority of voters declared support for a key 
element of the proposed Constitution that required state ownership of natural resources, skeptics 
                                                 
42 See generally Gudni A. Johannesson, Iceland Offshore Exploration, national Energy Authority 
of Iceland [https://perma.cc/2NJR-FCUE]. 
43 Jichang Lulu, Billions and Billions of Barrels of CNOOC in Iceland (Feb. 18, 2014) 
[https://perma.cc/WCE6-L9AS]. 
44 See generally Ministry Industry Report, Oil Exploration in the Dreki Area on the Jan Mayen 
Ridge, NATIONAL ENERGY AUTHORITY (Mar. 2007) [https://perma.cc/Z9T6-DXBM] (Strategic 
Environment Assessment of Jan Mayen Licensing Area shows the, yet unknown, but potential 
extent of the resource in the offshore petroleum joint development project Iceland-Norway 
offshore, the Dreki license.). 
45 See The Economy of Iceland, The Central Bank of Iceland (Oct. 2016) 
[https://perma.cc/3WP4-4SQE]. 
46 See A Proposal for a new Constitution for the Republic of Iceland, Stjournalagarad (Mar. 24, 
2011) [https://perma.cc/2WH7-ENL4]. 
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note that adoption in the short term is unlikely, given current Parliamentary opposition.  Yet, a 
national movement regarding distribution of petroleum revenues47 enjoys some degree of 
support in Iceland’s remote coastal communities in the north and northwest that have been 
significantly diminished to the impacts of globalization.  The coastal community interest, to 
reshape the meaning of recovery from economic collapse, is perhaps best reflected in Iceland’s 
Draft Article 34, a tentative and perhaps unlikely part of a basis for a proposed constitution Draft 
Article 34 states: “Iceland’s natural resources that are not private property shall be the joint and 
perpetual property of the nation. No one can acquire the natural resources, or rights connected 
thereto, as property or for permanent use and they may not be sold or pledged.”48 
Beyond the anticipated oil and gas revenues, Iceland contains the potential to offer a 
bridge between relevant international legal standards, its own legal and regulatory trajectory, 
implementation of the Norwegian Model, and a more strategic model for distributive justice that 
creates an even more resilient democracy.  
                                                 
47 Thorvaldur Gylfason The Icelandic Constitutional Reform: People, Principles and Process, 
Conference University Akureyri (Sept. 23-24, 2016). 
48 A Proposal for a new Constitution for the Republic of Iceland (Mar. 24, 2011) 
[https://perma.cc/J2BR-T3RS] (Iceland’s proposed Constitution, at Article 34, describes the 
ownership of natural resources to belong in perpetuity to the nation … in the public interest.” 
Further, several of Iceland’s major political parties have spoken of the “Norwegian Model” for 
investment and distribution of the nation’s natural resources revenues).  
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The issue of natural resource development is both personal and emotional in Iceland 
where fishing is the economic centerpiece of the nation’s economy and culture.49  The history of 
Iceland's rich fishing industry offers an example of globalization, the vertical integration of 
industry, and, perhaps paradoxically, what it has taken for Iceland’s commercial interests that 
built a world–class fishing industry. 
In part, to prevent what became substantial overfishing from domestic vessels, Iceland’s 
Parliament in 1990, through its Uniform Fisheries Management Act, produced a controversial 
quota system to provide protection for what counts today among the world’s most 
environmentally protected fisheries.50  In turn, those who hold the largest quotas created the 
controversial yet, world class, vertically integrated, high–tech, and globalized fishing industry.  
In the course of becoming a top exporter, the process, arguably, “crowded out” a significant 
                                                 
49 Gisli Pålsson & Agnar Helgason, FIGURING FISH AND MEASURING MEN: THE INDIVIDUAL 
TRANSFERABLE QUOTA SYSTEM IN THE ICELAND ICELANDIC COD FISHERY, 117-146, OCEAN & 
COASTAL MANAGEMENT (Elsevier Vol. 28 1995) (Abstract notes that the individual transferable 
quota (ITQ) system, introduced in 1984, concentrated access to fisheries on the basis of who 
happened to be boat owners and catch levels during the three-year period prior to the allocations. 
The ensuing public discontent and social repercussions has led to the current government 
expressing an interest in exploring the Norwegian Model with respect to collection, investment 
and allocation of natural resource revenues.). 
50 Bradley Turner, Iceland Offers a Model for Arctic Fisheries Management, ARCTIC DEEPLY 
(Dec. 9, 2016) [ https://perma.cc/5BZA-KCYL]. 
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number of local fishers, charged by some as leading to the collapse of the fishing communities, 
many of which hark to a fishing culture and industry over a thousand years old:   
 The market-based quota system led to social problems, including loss of jobs, 
outmigration, depopulation, a significant decrease in the value of homes and a 
sense of social alienation from the capital, Reykjavik. The village lost income and 
a thousand year old way of life based on fishing, diminished government support 
followed for regional development and, as the fishing industry consolidated, and, 
is currently situated among the world’s top ten fishing exporters, the 
government’s emphasis shifted from supporting employment and small-scale 
fishing industries to the increased productivity, efficiency and globalization of a 
fishing industry that is now dominated by four or five major companies that 
withdrew their trawlers from local villages into the capital or nearby areas.51 
 
An intense, national debate sprang from a core, yet controversial, quota system that limited 
access and catch to protect the fisheries and marine ecosystems as well as build a sustainable 
industry.  Where freedom to fish for the past millennia had been the norm, communities like 
Iceland’s far north and west are in collapse, as many of its fishing villages are bereft of once 
prevalent trawlers and jobs.52  However, coastal communities on the east, in close proximity to 
                                                 
51 Iceland Government Page, Icelandic Fisheries [https://perma.cc/6QCS-M78H] (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2017; see also Helgi Áss Grétarsson, Allocation of Desmersal Harvest Rights in 
Iceland, Arctic Review on Law and Politics (2010).  
52 Id.  
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the Dreki licensing region, are vying at municipal levels for government support to build a deep 
water port that is capable of supporting oil production and the likely increase in shipping traffic 
as the waters warm and High North shipping increases. 
1. Boom and Bust Oil Cycles 
Even though drilling is probably several years away, communities such as Finnafjord 
prepare to build port infrastructure to support offshore oil and gas and trans-Arctic shipping. 
Finnafjord’s projected port development project and Norway’s Sovereign Wealth fund’s 
distributions, reflect how revenues and development policy can be shaped for local and 
community benefit.53  As the Icelandic government proceeds to support the Finnafjord project, 
even as it grapples with its quandary of dispossessed, remote, coastal communities, the larger 
global challenge has been described as being “poised between an old world that no longer works 
and a new one struggling to be born.”54 
The Norwegian Model has engaged Iceland’s discourse both as a Constitutional matter55 
and a matter of reflection upon distribution of all of its offshore natural resources revenues.56  
The Norwegian Model offers the Iceland authorities both an effective track record on 
                                                 
53 THE BARENTS OBSERVER supra, note 46.  
54 David Bollier & Silke Helfrich, The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and 
State, xi (2012).  
55 A Proposal for a New Constitution for the Republic of Iceland, [Constitution] Mar. 24, 2011. 
art. 33-34. 
56 See Jane Mayen on the Exploration Map (Jan. 22, 2009) Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
[https://perma.cc/7TAZ-HYLM] (last visited Mar. 26, 2017).  
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environment and distribution of revenues and a unique relationship of trust as Iceland moves 
forward to develop its first offshore petroleum initiative.57 
IV. SOVEREIGNTY, JURISDICTION, AND GREEN SHOOTS OF DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 
Just as the Arctic region is defined by a combination of cooperation and co-existence, the 
1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) provides a linkage 
between maritime law, global justice, and trade.58  Further, international law, as it applies to 
sovereignty and jurisdiction in the world’s oceans, is directly tied to natural resources 
development.  The first obligation for any nation with interest in developing its natural resources, 
is to confirm that it has jurisdiction over the boundaries in which the resources exist.  Without 
clearly identified boundaries, jurisdiction remains in doubt, and thus investments are less 
likely.59  The foundational international legal framework60 for the procedures, authorities, and 
strategies that drive norms in the world’s oceans, offers a point of departure for a sovereign’s 
                                                 
57 Andrew Holland, Iceland, Like All Arctic Nations is Drilling for Oil, AM. SEC. PROJECT (Sept. 
4, 2015) https://www.americansecurityproject.org/iceland-like-all-arctic-nations-is-drilling-for-
oil/. 
58 JURGEN FRIEDRICH, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SOFT LAW 6-8 (2013).  
59 Helge Ryggvik, The Norwegian Oil Experience: A Toolbox for Managing Resources?, 
CENTRE FOR TECHNOLOGY, INNOVATION AND CULTURE, 10 (2010) [https://perma.cc/K2EW-
XZZU].  
60 DONALD R. ROTHWELL, THE POLAR REGIONS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
116 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996)  
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right to exploit the resources within its jurisdictional waters.61  
A.  United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
Referred to as the “Constitution of the Oceans,” the United Nations Convention of the 
Law of the Sea emerged on December 10, 1982.  Unfortunately, it was not until 1994 that the 
Treaty attained the signatures of the sixty requisite parties that brought it into force, despite 
hopes for universal participation.  The product of the longest running negotiation in the history of 
the United Nations, UNCLOS has been called a “balance” of competing interests.  Its core 
challenge was to balance the breadth of coastal state projections of sovereignty over adjacent 
seas and oceans and, its opposite, marine power demands for freedom of the high seas.  
B.  Exclusive Economic Zone 
 The establishment of the EEZ, an establishment that extended the jurisdiction of coastal 
states over waters adjacent to territorial waters, was directly connected to commercial activities, 
particularly oil and gas exploration and fishing.  In 1945, perhaps as a precursor to UNCLOS, 
President Truman asserted the right of the United States to claim jurisdiction over the natural 
resources in the continental shelf adjacent to coastal regions. 62  In 1972, Iceland, like several 
                                                 
61 Id. 
62 Laura Beckman & Tara Davenport, The EEZ Regime: Reflections After 30 Years, LOSI 
CONFERENCE PAPERS (2012) [https://perma.cc/PDY5-YXZ7] (In 1945, President Harry S. 
Truman, responding in part to pressure from domestic oil interests, unilaterally extended United 
States jurisdiction over all natural resources on that nation's continental shelf - oil, gas, minerals, 
etc. This was the first major challenge to the freedom-of-the-seas doctrine. Other nations soon 
followed suit). 
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Latin American nations, established the 200 nautical mile fishing zone to demonstrate its 
preferential right to fish in its coastal waters. 63  When UNCLOS later established the 200 
nautical mile EEZ, called “entirely new maritime zones,” 64 coastal and littoral States were able 
to enjoy the exclusive sovereign right to “explore, exploit, conserve and manage” 65 the natural 
resources, living or non-living, in the seabed of its territorial waters, its subsoil and water 
column. 66  However, counter arguments suggest that this new global legal framework provided 
                                                 
63 Gudni Johanesson, The Jan Mayen Dispute Between Iceland and Norway, 1979-1981, ARCTIC 
FRONTIERS (Jan. 24, 2013) [https://perma.cc/2G4U-VRXB]; Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 
Judgement, 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); see also R.R. Churchill, The Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases: 
The Contribution of the International Court of Justice to the Debate on Coastal States’ Fisheries 
Rights, 24 INT’L. AND COMP. L.Q. 82, 82-105 (1975). 
64 Tim Stephens & Donald R. Rothwell, The LOSC Framework for Maritime Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement 30 Years On, 27 INT’L. J. OF MARINE & COASTAL L. 701, 703 (2012); Beckham, 
supra note 73. 
65 CHRIS ARMSTRONG, JUSTICE AND NATURAL RESOURCE: AN EGALITARIAN THEORY 202-205 
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2017) (UNCLOS provides only a “quasi-sovereignty” over the EEZ waters 
as the sovereign’s legal regime does “not extend all the elements of state sovereignty to EEZs.”). 
66 DONALD R. ROTHWELL & TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 82-97 (Hart 
Publishing, 2010) (The Exclusive Economic Zone perhaps the most significant UNCLOS zone, 
extended coastal state sovereignty to 200 nautical miles from the coastal state baseline, where 
coastal states have sovereignty over living and non-living resources and an exclusive 
responsibility to protect the marine environment). 
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“legal cover for a rapid resource-grab,” 67  given the twin realities of the “newly created EEZs” 
combined with the right of coastal states to extend the outer continental shelves that “contains 
the vast majority of the known oil and gas reserves contained under the seabed. . . .” 68 
C.  Common Heritage of Mankind 
In the view of the skeptics, UNCLOS established a foundational international right to a 
distribution of revenues generated from resources exploited in the seabed of the high seas.  
Referred to as UNCLOS’ “most innovative"69 and “most controversial” 70 and, perhaps, most 
contentious Article, the oceans treaty established the principle, through its Common Heritage of 
Mankind Article,71  that the deep seabed, subsoil and its resources are beyond national 
jurisdiction, and, thus not subject to national jurisdiction or appropriation. 72  
                                                 
67 Armstrong, supra note 74, at 202-205. 
68 J. Evensen, Working Methods and Procedures in the Third United Nations Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, 199 Recueil des Cours 414, 436 (1986). 
69 Stephens, supra note 73, at 701-709. 
70 Peter Tzeng, Supplemental Jurisdiction Under UNCLOS, 38 HOUSTON J. OF INT’L. L. 499, 503 
(2016). 
71 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 140, para. 1-2, Dec. 10, 1982 
[https://perma.cc/3Z5V-AC4C].  
72 Id. at art. 137, para. 1 (providing that: “No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or 
sovereign rights over any part of the area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or 
juridical person appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or 
sovereign rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.”). 
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The distributive ethos established in UNCLOS Article 137 finds its roots in a speech of 
given before the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations on January 11, 
1967.  The speech contemplated technological developments that were making the high seas 
accessible to mining, oil, and gas production, and argued that there should be “no public or 
private appropriation” of the high seas, that the high seas be used “exclusively for peaceful 
purposes,” belonging to all of humankind that retains a collective right to benefit from any 
development, “rather than exclusively benefit the richest states with the most advanced mining 
capabilities.” 73  Specific processes and environmental standards have not yet significantly 
materialized, but this speech set the next stage for distributive norms development for global 
resources regimes for nation states both multilaterally and, to some extent, influencing domestic 
policy.74   
                                                 
73 United Nations General Assembly, First Committee 1515th Meeting, UNITED NATIONS 
OFFICIAL RECORDS (Nov. 1, 1967, 10:30AM) [https://perma.cc/69ZN-43KD]; see also THOMAS 
COTTIER, EQUITABLE PRINCIPLES OF MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 64-65 (Cambridge 
Univ. Press, 2015) (Cottier cautions that deep sea-bed mining, compensatory rights and, over-
fishing in the high seas evokes the “tragedy of the commons” as well as distributive justice in the 
international arena); Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243-1248 
(1968). 
74 Rowland J. Harrison, Article 82 of UNCLOS: The Day of Reckoning Approaches, 10 J. OF 
WORLD ENERGY & BUS. L. 488, 488-452 (2017); see also Caitlyn Antrim, The International 
Seabed Authority Turns Twenty, 16 GEO. J. OF INT’L. AFF. 188, 188-196 (2015) 
[https://perma.cc/YF4Q-B4HK]. 
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With its “Common Heritage of Mankind” proviso, UNCLOS offers a legal basis in 
international law that links sovereignty, jurisdiction, state action, and a distributive philosophy 
for revenues generated from natural resources development. 75  UNCLOS, particularly through 
its Common Heritage of Mankind Article, raises a question of international law: should natural 
resources be developed with revenues distributed to benefit a national citizenry or, to only a few 
owners?76 
D.  More Green Shoots: Environmental Protections and Public Participation 
                                                 
75 JAMES HARRISON, MAKING THE LAW OF THE SEA 60 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2011) (noting 
that the provisions of UNCLOS, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and the Arctic 
Council, form the core of the international legal regime that governs the Arctic, although it is 
individual state jurisdiction that applies to jurisdictional waters of the coastal states. While the 
United States, a leading maritime power, has not yet ratified UNCLOS, the U.S. does accept 
much of the Treaty as customary international law. All of the other Arctic nations have ratified 
the treaty); see also Rebecca Bratspies, Human Rights and Arctic Resources, 15 SW. J. OF INT’L. 
L. 251, 251-281 (2009) [https://perma.cc/N4AZ-RTSJ]; see also Commander Robert C. “Rock” 
De Tolve,  At What Cost? America’s UNCLOS Allergy in the Time of “Lawfare”, 61 NAVAL L. 
R. 1, 1-16 (2012) [https://perma.cc/9KTJ-W953]. 
76 Armstrong, supra note 76, at 217 (Primarily focusing on the 200 mile EEZ for littoral states, 
Armstrong notes that Ambassador Pardo was “crushed by the eventual form that UNCLOS took, 
describing it as “probably the most inequitable treaty that has ever ben signed.” However, despite 
distributive inequities, in the Common Heritage of Mankind Article, Armstrong wrote, Pardo 
“found hope.”). 
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The growing regulatory support for inclusion of community stakeholders in 
Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIA”) has become a basis both for best practices in 
environmental protections, and a process by which new issues are uncovered.77  Over the past 
forty years, the development and evolution of EIA, Strategic Environmental Assessments 
(“SEA”), and Trans-boundary Environmental Impact Assessments (“TEIA”) advanced from 
controversial frontline views to commonly held norms in both domestic and international law.78  
The EIA acknowledges the centrality of communities located in the footprint of operations to 
fully understand any adverse environmental impacts, and the implications for communities 
located in the footprint of operations.79  The public participation standard for environmental 
assessments in both domestic and international law offers a significant brick in the edifice of 
                                                 
77 KEES BASTMEIJER & TIMO KOIVUROVA, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF TRANS-BOUNDARY 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 1-28 (2007) (describing the evolution of Trans-boundary 
EIA between states, EIA for activities in international and shared areas, and EIA required by 
international financial institutions). 
78 Bram Noble et al., Strategic Environmental Assessment Opportunities and Risks for Arctic 
Offshore Energy Planning and Development, 39 MARINE POL’Y 296, 296-302 (2013); see also 
Tyra Ohman, Strategic Environmental Assessment in Norway’s Offshore Oil and Gas (Mar. 
2013) (unpublished Masters of Arts thesis) (on file with the University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon library system).  
79 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Due Diligence Guidance for 
Meaningful Stakeholder Engagement in the Extractives Sector, 20 (Apr. 2015) 
[https://perma.cc/3B7M-V275]. 
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distributive justice to entire communities where natural resources development is concerned. The 
public participation requirements reflect a greater democratization of processes where large-scale 
development, particularly in the extractives sector, is proposed.80 
The globally accepted environmental norms and standards, EIA, SEA, TEIA, emerged 
through external drivers visible in the form of a loose network of hundreds of interconnected 
environmental advocacy groups that employed a variety of, often interlinked, policy, 
organizational, and media strategies.  This advocacy has moved the political needle toward 
greater stakeholder input by emphasizing the soft law norms of corporate social responsibility, 
stakeholder risk assessments, and social license to operate (“SLO”).81  The combined pressures 
by organized advocacy networks, litigators, scientists, and impacted communities gave rise to 
these critical public participation requirements.82 
E.  Indigenous Rights and Sovereignty 
                                                 
80 See Alan Boyle, Developments in International Law of the EIA and their Relationship to the 
Espo Conference, 20 REV. OF EUR. COMP. AND INT’L. ENVTL. L. 229 (2011); see also NEIL 
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Perhaps the strongest expression of participatory rights in international law is found in 
the land and sovereignty rights of Indigenous peoples to fully participate and consent to any form 
of natural resources production on treaty, sovereign, or aboriginal lands.83  Indigenous peoples 
achieved the right to say “no” to proposed natural resources projects.  The ability to say “no” to 
proposed development on tribal, treaty, aboriginal, or culturally significant lands, is a critical 
departure from colonial models of the past and present.84 
Somewhat like large-scale commercial interests, environmental NGOs have advocated 
policies that, while designed to offer protection to the environment, marine ecosystems, or 
climate, their policy prescriptions often bypass, or negate, the interests and inputs of residents of 
the same Indigenous, coastal, and small communities.  Participatory rights, particularly where 
                                                 
83 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 18-19, Sept. 13 2007 
[https://perma.cc/3PQ3-G2YE] (Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), is the principle that a 
community has the right to give or withhold its consent to proposed projects that may affect the 
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84 Parshuram Tamang, An Overview of the Principle of Free, Prior and Informed Consent and 
Indigenous Peoples in International and Domestic Law and Practice, UNITED NATIONS, at 6 
(Jan. 17-19, 2005) [https://perma.cc/869D-8TJA]; see generally John B. Henriksen, Oil and Gas 
Operations in Indigenous Peoples’ Lands and Territories in the Arctic: A Human Rights 
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natural resources are at play, are central to any meaningful approach to distributive justice.85  The 
trend in international jurisprudence toward greater public participation appears to cement not 
only principles of distributive justice but also of democracy itself.86 
V. EVOLUTION OF THE NORWEGIAN MODEL 
The widening demands for states to take action to protect their citizenry in a globalizing 
world offers an opportunity to do better in the 21st century.  One nation that demonstrates an 
expansion of both principles and processes of distributive justice toward accomplishing this 
daunting, yet vital, task of our globalizing era is the government and people of Norway.87  
Norway has linked its world class, oil financed, Sovereign Wealth Fund with a process of 
national economic distribution that offers a distributive example that is referred to with global 
respect, as “the Norwegian Model.”88 
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The Kingdom of Norway has charted a course to distribute its gains from offshore natural 
resources development for the benefit of its national citizenry through a strategy that the World 
Economic Forum has called “inclusive growth.”89  The Norwegian Model is being observed with 
interest worldwide, particularly by Iceland, as the nation prepares to develop offshore petroleum 
in cooperation with Norway, should the petroleum exist in sufficient quantity. 
It has been thirty-five years since the Iceland–Norway Conciliation Commission made its 
determination regarding joint use of the Icelandic offshore, nearly fifty years since Norway 
entered the world of energy exploration in its outer continental shelf, and four years since 
Iceland’s Eykon Energy teamed up with China’s CNOOC to bid for a license in collaboration 
with Iceland’s National Energy Authority in the offshore Dreki license of the Jan Mayen waters 
located between Iceland and Norway.90  Thus, it is an opportune moment to briefly reflect upon 
the Norwegian Model as a standard-setting approach as petroleum development unfolds in the 
Jan Mayen waters.91 
A.  Offshore Petroleum and Social Supports 
Norway, the world's third-largest exporter of natural gas and the seventh largest oil 
                                                 
89 Id; Øysetin Noreng, THE OIL INDUSTRY AND GOVERNMENT STRATEGY IN THE NORTH SEA 109-
127 (Croom Helm Ltd., 1980). 
90 Iceland-Norway: Agreement on the Continental Shelf Between Iceland and Jan Mayen, 21(6) 
INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 1222, 1222-1226 (1982); see Adina Anghelache, History of 
Unitization-based Cooperation in the Development of Offshore Cross-Border Disputes, ENERGY 
POLICY GROUP (Aug. 15, 2017) [https://perma.cc/TX73-BEG4]. 
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exporter to the global market, is considered a highly successful model of petroleum 
development. 92  Revenues from the sale of oil and gas have played a vital role in the creation 
and maintenance of Norway’s high levels of social, political, and economic quality of life that 
count amongst the world’s best.93 
 The total export value of oil, gas, and related products in 2015 was about 350 billion 
Norwegian Krone (“NOK”) or about 47 percent of the total value of Norwegian goods, this 
correlates to $42 billion USD.94  Most Norwegian oil and gas is transported by a fleet of shuttle 
tankers from the Norwegian shelf to European destinations, including the UK, and by large 
tankers to the Mediterranean and Asia.95 
 Norway’s nearly $500 billion economy is dwarfed by its $960 billion Sovereign Wealth 
Fund which is financed by petroleum revenues and decades of wise investments.96  The 
petroleum industry plays a vital role in the Norwegian economy as, under Norwegian law, 
petroleum revenues and taxes finance the Government Pension Fund Global, the world’s largest 
                                                 
92 See Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, An Industry for the Future – Norway’s 
Petroleum Activities, 42-51 (June 24, 2011) [https://perma.cc/ WF9H-EXEC]. 
93 Norwegian Petroleum, Exports of Oil and Gas (last visited Mar. 24, 2017) 
[https://perma.cc/NAT7-ZM36]. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96Factbox: Norway’s $960 Billion Sovereign Wealth Fund, REUTERS (June 2, 2017) 
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sovereign wealth fund.97  Transfers made from the Fund support public priorities without 
drawing down the Fund’s capital.98 
In 2016, about one in nine NOK spent from the fiscal budget came from the Government 
Pension Fund Global, which helps to finance Norway’s extensive social support system.99  The 
long-term management perspective of Norway’s petroleum revenues is designed to ensure that 
Norwegian society and future generations will benefit from Norway’s petroleum wealth.  The oil 
and gas sector is Norway's largest when measured in terms of value added, government 
revenues, national investments, and export value.100 
In 2016, about 185,300 people in Norway, a labor force of about 2.8 million, were 
directly or indirectly employed in the petroleum sector.101  This amount is about 47,000 fewer 
than in 2013, due to the collapse in the price of oil.102  With a labor force expanding and 
contracting along with the petroleum boom-bust cycle, government officials opted to maintain 
patterns of production and employment with petroleum revenues, rather than changing them, 
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resisting a “temptation to solve economic and political problems through increased use of oil 
revenues,”103 the epitome of the “resource curse.” 
B.  Socially Responsible System of Governance 
North Sea petroleum was discovered in commercial quantity in the early 1960s, followed 
by the enormous Ekofisk find in 1969.104  At this point, the Norwegian government had little 
knowledge of the technical and commercial practices of the oil industry.105  However, the nation 
did have significant experience with its highly effective hydropower and commercial fishing 
industries.  Thus, Norway entered its petroleum era with the advantage of a highly capable 
system of governance combined with experience regulating other natural resources industries.106 
 With its strong democratic government, well–organized trade unions, progressive 
taxation policies, a relatively extensive system of social benefits, and a history of social 
grievance systems, the Norwegian government was able to shape its own priorities regarding 
petroleum development.107  The Norwegian government designed a development approach that 
allowed itself the time to develop an institutional capacity to produce, while exercising control 
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over the production, the rate of depletion, and the extent and approach to environmental 
protections.  
 Norway’s cautious approach allowed the government to protect its ability to maintain 
freedom of action from an external industry’s timetable.  The hybrid strategy that emerged—the 
Norwegian Model—sought to meet its national political and economic priorities.108  The 
government opted to keep the petroleum industry under firm public control, with Statoil being 
the primary instrument through which the government would implement both its oil policy and 
exploitation of the resource.  A primary purpose for developing a new wealth was to make 
Norway a “qualitatively better society.”109  The earliest plans included a series of social, 
regional, environmental, and industrial policies to achieve this goal, through a social democratic 
approach.110 
C.  Paced Development 
Norway created three separate entities to govern, produce, and regulate oil exploration 
and production.  These entities include a national oil company engaged in commercial 
hydrocarbon operations, a government ministry to set policy, and a regulatory agency to provide 
oversight and technical expertise.111  This system of checks and balances helps to avoid conflicts 
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of interests, allows Statoil, the national oil company, to develop commercial opportunities, while 
the government agencies regulate the operators, including Statoil.  
 As a governance matter, an ongoing challenge for Norway is to keep Statoil from 
becoming a “state within a state,” even as the national oil company has become commercially 
competitive worldwide.112  Norwegian leadership designed extraction rates so that the nation will 
continue to produce well into the 21st century.  As petroleum on Norway’s continental shelf 
matures, new fields are becoming increasingly necessary.  Norway continues to create a 
corporate model that is capable of withstanding many of globalization’s anti-democratic 
environmental and social pressures.113  The combination of its regulatory and management 
strategies, along with its allocation of revenues, to its meticulously attended Sovereign Wealth 
Fund, intended to benefit the entire population. 
Norway’s general tax on the petroleum industry was followed by a Special Tax for the 
industry’s extraordinary returns on production.114  The current ordinary company tax rate is 24 
percent and the special tax rate is upwards of 54 percent.  Innovations such as the Special Tax, 
similar to an excess profits tax, allows for taxation policy and the Sovereign Wealth Fund to 
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maintain the revenue distributions that, in part, allow remote and coastal fishing communities to 
remain viable.115 
D. Challenges and Downsides 
The more recent Greenpeace lawsuit against the Norwegian government for granting 
licenses to energy companies to drill in the Barents Sea, suggests new legal fronts are opening 
against the production of Arctic oil.116  A core question is whether Norway’s Sovereign Wealth 
Fund will continue to be funded exclusively by petroleum revenues, as the non-renewable 
resource is subject not only to volatile oil prices, but a finite future.117  Given that the small, 
remote, coastal fishing villages, depend in part, upon the Sovereign Wealth Fund revenues to 
sustain the local fishing industries, another question that underlies the Sovereign Wealth Fund 
discourse, is whether a greater diversity of natural resources would sustain the Sovereign Wealth 
Fund and make sense for the long term. 
Beyond concerns regarding peak oil, or peak demand, for outer-continental shelf oil, new 
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pressures are emerging from litigation.118  As Statoil seeks new fields in joint operations on its 
Russian border, Statoil is bridging the “all of the above” approach to energy development by 
expanding its operations to include renewables, such as its geothermal project in Iceland’s 
offshore. 
Whether all nations have something to learn from this particular high North approach to 
egalitarian distributions of resource revenue, or, distributive justice, remains to be seen.  
However, if any two nations can make a contribution to stop the marginalizing of remote, 
coastal, and small communities, it would, indeed, be Iceland and Norway, in their cooperative 
venture.  As perhaps the most resilient and nimble of the Arctic nations, both Iceland and 
Norway share a sensibility and capability to build community-government-corporate interactive 
systems that epitomize distributive justice.  Iceland and Norway have ignited discussion in both 
nations, and beyond, about the meaning of equitability, sustainability119 and its corollary: 
distribution of revenues120 particularly regarding small, remote, coastal communities that depend 
upon or are positioned in the midst of offshore natural resources development. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
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The widening responsibility of nations to take corrective action in the form of structural 
changes to protect their citizenry in a globalizing world is particularly vital in the Arctic High 
North.  While the number of energy producing countries is growing worldwide, all eight of the 
Arctic nations are significantly involved in natural resources development.  International law 
offers a framework of standards and norms that trend toward expanding and protecting entire 
communities that have been, or will be, marginalized by the forces of globalization.  However, 
irrespective of the “cascade” of international standards and norms, local residents are generally 
clear about their specific expectations from oil or gas projects, both in environmental, economic, 
and cultural terms. 
Distributive justice is not a matter of welfare, nor, of an absolute equality of distribution. 
The Norwegian Model and Iceland’s deliberate, skilled, and thoughtful process to navigate, 
emulate, cooperate, and break-ground, demonstrates how systemic, logical, and responsive 
thinking can both anticipate and mitigate globalization’s downsides to include otherwise 
vulnerable communities in its successes. 
 
 
